2019-05-18 作者: 台湾研究 来源 MD: 逐段点评



How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument

https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf, http://jenpan.com/jen_pan/50c.pdf

Gary King† Jennifer Pan‡ Margaret E. Roberts§ April 9, 2017

(还记得这个Jennifer Pan吗?她就是那篇’中国意识形态光谱’的一作\ Jennifer Pan, Yiqing Xu, “China’s Ideological Spectrum”(《中国的意识形态光谱》))


The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2,000,000 people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called “50c party” posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of the vast majority of posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet, almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim, or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime’s strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime’s strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We show that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to distract the public and change the subject, as most of the these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program, and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of “common knowledge” and information control in authoritarian regimes




  1. Introduction 介绍
  2. What We Think We Know 我们以为我们知道什么\
  3. Leaked Internet Propaganda Office Communications 泄漏的互联网宣传办公室通信\
  4. Content of 50c Posts 五毛贴的内容\
  5. Verification by Direct Survey 直接调查报告验证\
  6. Size of the 50c Party 五毛党的体量\
  7. What Might Be Wrong? 哪些东西可能是错的?\
  8. Theoretical Implications 理论性启示\
  9. Concluding Remarks 结论要点\
    • Appendix A Categorization Scheme 附录A 分类方式\
    • Appendix B An Unintended ‘Survey’ of the Chinese Government 附录B 关于中国政府的一份不经意调查


9 结论要点(机翻并经本人校验)




–Jennifer Pan的另几篇相关论文–


  1. Pan, Jennifer. 2019. “How Chinese Officials Use the Internet to Construct their Public Image.” Political Science Research and Methods 7(2): 197-213. (PDF, Appendix, Replication)
  2. Muise, Daniel and Jennifer Pan. 2019. “Online Field Experiments.” Asian Journal of Communication 29(3): 217-234. (PDF)
  3. Pan, Jennifer and Kaiping Chen. 2018. “Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances.” American Political Science Review 112(3): 602-620. (PDF, Appendix, Replication)
  4. Anjalie Field; Doron Kliger; Shuly Wintner; Jennifer Pan; Dan Jurafsky; and Yulia Tsvetkov. 2018. “Framing and Agenda-setting in Russian News: a Computational Analysis of Intricate Political Strategies.” EMNLP 2018. (PDF)
  5. Pan, Jennifer and Yiqing Xu. 2018. “China’s Ideological Spectrum.” The Journal of Politics 80(1): 254-273. (PDF, Appendix, Replication)
  6. Jaros, Kyle and Jennifer Pan. 2018. “China’s Newsmakers: How Media Power is Shifting in the Xi Jinping Era.” The China Quarterly 233: 111-136. (PDF, Appendix)



这篇文章认为五毛行动的目的不仅仅是宣传官方观点,还有干扰正常讨论,给网络社区参沙子的战略目的。当然这些在那篇网评员内部资料里其实都有了。不过他利用https://xiaolan.me 泄漏出来的内部通讯资料对网络舆论控制的整个的组织结构进行了分析,对五毛的来源也进行了分析,我把原文的结论更新到主贴了。附录也蛮有意思的。


How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression


We offer the first large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented. To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social media services all over China before the Chinese government is able to find, evaluate, and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the subset they deem objectionable. Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt to and validate in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in each of 85 topic areas. Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or may occur in the future—and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent.


我们提供了第一次大规模,多源分析的结果,可能是有史以来实施过最广泛的选择性审查人类表达的行为。为此,我们设计了一个系统来定位,下载和分析来自全中国近1,400种不同社交媒体服务的数百万社交媒体帖子的内容,赶在中国政府能进行查找,评估和审查(即,从互联网上删除)他们认为的反抗内容子集。利用我们找到并用中文验证过的现代计算机辅助文本分析方法,我们比较了审查的帖子的实质内容与85个主题领域中每个未审查的帖子。与先前的谅解相反,对国家,其领导人及其政策的负面甚至尖刻批评的帖子不太可能被审查。相反,我们表明,审查计划旨在通过沉默代表,加强或促进社会动员的评论来遏制集体行动,而不论其内容如何。审查制度旨在试图阻止现在或将来可能发生的集体活动 - 因此,它们似乎清楚地暴露了政府的意图。




@pc6619 关于五毛的构成还是挺符合实际的。 不过还要补充几点: 除了政府雇员外还有各种大中专院校的学生,总之只要是能轻松被体制威逼利诱的人员,都可能有这种兼职行为。 无论是不是被专门授意去做五毛的,中国的体制决定了,中国有大量居民是由政府圈养的、而非以独立创造交换价值为生的人,这样的人出于维护自己经济来源的目的而发表言论,都属于广义上“拿政府钱为政府说话”行为,这样的人属于广义上的五毛。 从这一点上来说,只要是体制内的人员,只要为体制说话,那就是五毛。只有在从未接受过补贴的私营经济体中工作的为体制说话的人员才能算做是“自干五”。

tags: 论文 五毛党 社交媒体 舆论